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• 1988: Morris worm exploits buffer overflows in 
fingerd to infect 6,000 servers
• 2001: Code Red exploits buffer overflows in 
IIS to infect 250,000 servers 
– Single largest cause of vulnerabilities in CERT 
advisories
– Buffer overflow threatens Internet- WSJ(1/30/01)
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Why aren’t we better off than 
we were 13 years ago? 
• Ignorance
• C is difficult to use securely
– Unsafe functions
– Confusing APIs
• Even security aware programmers make mistakes.
• Security Knowledge has not been codified into the 
development process
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Automated Tools
• Run-time solutions
– StackGuard[USENIX 7], gcc bounds-checking, 
libsafe[USENIX 2000]
– Performance penalty
– Turns buffer overflow into a DoS attack
• Compile-time solutions - static analysis
– No run-time performance penalty
– Checks properties of all possible executionsDavid Larochelle
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Design Goals
• Tool that can be used by typical programmers as 
part of the development process
– Fast, Easy to Use
• Tool that can be used to check legacy code
– Handles typical C programs
• Encourage a proactive security methodology
– Document key assumptions 
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Our approach
• Document assumptions about buffer sizes
– Semantic comments
– Provide annotated standard library
– Allow user's to annotate their code
• Find inconsistencies between code and 
assumptions 
• Make compromises to get useful checking
– Use simplifying assumptions to improve efficiency
– Use heuristics to analyze common loop idioms
– Accept some false positives and false negatives 
(unsound and incomplete analysis)
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Implementation
• Extended LCLint
– Open source checking tool [FSE ‘94] [PLDI ‘96]
– Uses annotations
– Detects null dereferences, memory leaks, etc.
• Integrated to take advantage of existing 
checking and annotations (e.g., modifies)
• Added new annotations and checking for 
buffer sizes
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Annotations
• requires, ensures
• maxSet
– highest index that can be safely written to
• maxRead
– highest index that can be safely read
• char buffer[100];
– ensures maxSet(buffer) == 99David Larochelle
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SecurityFocus.com Example
void func(char *str){                               
char buffer[256];                            
strncat(buffer, str, sizeof(buffer) - 1); 
return; 
}
char *strncat (char *s1, char *s2, size_t n)
/*@requires maxSet(s1) 
>=maxRead(s1) + n@*/
uninitialized array
Source: Secure Programming working document,
SecurityFocus.com
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strncat.c:4:21: Possible out-of-bounds store: 
strncat(buffer, str, sizeof((buffer)) - 1); 
Unable to resolve constraint:
requires maxRead (buffer @ strncat.c:4:29)  <= 0 
needed to satisfy precondition:
requires maxSet (buffer @ strncat.c:4:29)  
>= maxRead (buffer @ strncat.c:4:29) + 255
derived from strncat precondition: 
requires maxSet (<parameter 1>) 
>=  maxRead (<parameter1>) + <parameter 3>
Warning Reported
char *  strncat (char *s1, char *s2, size_t n) 
/*@requires maxSet(s1) >= maxRead(s1) + n @*/ 
char buffer[256];
strncat(buffer, str, sizeof(buffer) - 1); 
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Overview of checking
• Intraprocedural
– But use annotations on called procedures and 
global variables to check calls, entry, exit points
• Expressions generate constraints
– C semantics, annotations
• Axiomatic semantics propagates constraints
• Simplifying rules                                  
(e.g. maxRead(str+i) ==> maxRead(str) - i)
• Produce warnings for unresolved constraints
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Loop Heuristics
• Recognize common loop idioms
• Use heuristics to guess number of iterations
• Analyze first and last iterations
Example:
for (init; *buf; buf++) 
– Assume maxRead(buf) iterations
– Model first and last iterationsDavid Larochelle
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Case studies
• wu-ftpd 2.5 and BIND 8.2.2p7
– Detected known buffer overflows
– Unknown buffer overflows exploitable with 
write access to config files
• Performance
– wu-ftpd: 7 seconds/ 20,000 lines of code
– BIND: 33 seconds / 40,000 lines
– Athlon 1200 MHz
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Results
95 writes
166 reads
132 writes
220 reads
- Other 
Warnings
4
40
19
LCLint 
warnings 
with no 
annotations 
added
4 55 strncpy
21 97 strcpy
12 27 strcat
LCLint 
warning 
with 
annotations
Instances in 
wu-ftpd 
(grep)
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int acl_getlimit(char *class, char *msgpathbuf)
{
struct aclmember *entry = NULL;
while (getaclentry("limit", &entry)) {
…
strcpy(msgpathbuf, entry->arg[3]); 
LCLint reports a possible buffer overflow for 
strcpy(msgpathbuf, entry->arg[3]);  LCLint reports an error at a call site of acl_getlimit 
wu-ftpd vulnerablity
/*@requires maxSet(msgpathbuf) >= 1023 @*/ /*@requires maxSet(msgpathbuf) >= 1023 @*/
strncpy(msgpathbuf, entry->arg[3], 1023);
msgpathbuf[1023] = ‘\0’; 
strncpy(msgpathbuf, entry->arg[3], 199);
msgpathbuf[199] = ‘\0’; 
/*@requires maxSet(msgpathbuf) >= 199  @*/ /*@requires maxSet(msgpathbuf) >= 199  @*/ int access_ok( int msgcode) {
char class[1024], msgfile[200];
int limit;
… 
limit = acl_getlimit(class, msgfile);
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Related Work
• Lexical analysis
– grep, its4, RATS, FlawFinder
• Wagner, Foster, Brewer [NDSSS ‘00]
– Integer range constraints
– Flow insensitive analysis
• Dor, Rodeh and Sagiv [SAS ‘01] 
– Source-to-source transformation with asserts 
and additional variables. David Larochelle
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Impediments to wide spread 
adoption
• People are lazy
• Programmers are especially lazy
• Adding annotations is too much work 
(except for security weenies)
• Working on techniques for automating the 
annotation process
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Conclusion
• 2014:???
– Will buffer overflows still be common?
– Codify security knowledge in tools real 
programmers can use
Beta version now available: 
http://lclint.cs.virginia.edu
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